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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
DALE H. MORGAN,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
vs.
BARBARA A. MORGAN, EVA S. BARNEY
BARNEY and VALLEY BANK & TRUST
COMPANY, a Utah corporation; each
of the above-named defendants personally, if living, the unknown
spouse, heirs, devisees, assignees,
personal representatives, and all
creditors of each of the deceased
defendants; also all other persons
unknown claiming any right, title,
estate, interest or lien upon the
real property described in the
Complaint adverse to plaintiff's
ownership or clouding plaintiff's
title thereto,

REPLY BRIEF
OF APPELLANT

Case No. 920846

Priority No. 16

Defendants and Appellants.
Barbara A. Morgan, defendant and appellant (hereinafter
"defendant"), hereby replies to the Brief of Appellee, Dale H.
Morgan, (hereinafter "plaintiff") as follows:
ARGUMENT
POINT I.

THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM IS NOT A

FINAL JUDGMENT, AND THEREFORE THIS APPEAL IS PREMATURE.
Plaintiff does not discuss defendant's arguments (as
made in her original brief) under this same point, except to say
in effect that the judgment is final because the court signed the
Summary Judgment after defendant had filed her objections under

Rule 4-504(2) of the Code of Judicial Administration.

The

plaintiff states in his brief at page 11:
"Clearly, this action on the part of the trial court
constitutes a denial of the defendant's objection to the
proposed order. Therefore, this appeal is from a final
order." (Emphasis added.)
If this result is "clear" to the plaintiff, then perhaps he will
allow that it should also be "clear" to the defendant, and if it
is "clear" to the defendant that this appeal is from a final
judgment, it is hard to understand how (if the court on appeal
should find that it is not a final judgment) defendant can be
accused of filing the appeal "knowing it to be premature, and not
from a final judgment," and that therefore defendant should be
saddled with attorney's fees.

Plaintiff fails to explain how it

can be clear to plaintiff that it is a final judgment, but that
defendant must know that it is premature.
The interaction between said Rule 4-504(2) and Rule 4 of
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure is not crystal clear.

In Tolboe

Const, v. Staker Paving & Const., 682 P2d 843 (Utah 1984), the
ruling of the court appears to mean that an objection under Rule
4-504(2) tolls the time in which to appeal until the objection is
specifically ruled on.

In Tolboe the court signed the judgment

before the objection thereto was made, and that also appears to be
the case in Calfo v. D.C. Stewart Co., 717 P2d 697 (Utah 1986);
Wayne Garff Constr. Co. v. Richards, 706 P2d 1065 (Utah 1985) ;
Larsen v. Larsen 674 P2d 116, (Utah 1983); and Bigelow v.
Inqersoll, 618 P2d 50 (Utah 1980).
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When the court signs an order without expressly noting
that the court is thereby overruling any such objection, the
litigant is literally left in the dark as to where he stands with
respect to the necessity of appealing within thirty days.

Any

prudent attorney is not going to risk losing his client's lawsuit
because he makes the wrong decision on that point.

Furthermore,

as noted in defendant's original brief, in Note 4 of the case of
Workman v. Nagle Const. Inc., 802 P2d 749 (Utah App. 1990), casts
doubt on the continued validity of Tolboe and its companion cases.
In times gone by, the District Courts had regular law
and motion calendars, and a litigant could get on a calendar
rather rapidly.

If we had such a procedure at the present time, a

litigant could get before the court for clarification within the
thirty-day period, but where litigants do not have ready access to
law and motion calendars, they are normally required to wait until
the court gets around to their written submissions, and that is
frequently not accomplished within the thirty-day deadline
involved in appeals.
In short, it was defendant's view that the objection
stayed the appeal time, but because of the risk to the defendant,
defendant's counsel did not feel that they could rely on that view
because of the possibility that plaintiff's view (that the
judgment is final) might be accepted by the court.
POINT II.

A COTENANT CANNOT DEAL WITH THE COMMON

PPROPERTY IN A MANNER ADVERSE TO THE INTERESTS OF HIS OR HER
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COTENANTS, AND ACTIONS BY ONE COTENANT TO PRESERVE THE PROPERTY
INURE AS A MATTER OF LAW TO THE BENEFIT OF ALL OF THE COTENANTS.
Plaintiff attempts to circumvent defendant's arguments
regarding this point as made in her orginal brief on two alleged
grounds:

(1) that plaintiff and defendant "were not cotenants of

the property in issue at any time relevant to these proceedings,"
and (2) that this case does not involve "adverse possession."
With respect to whether or not the parties were
cotenants, plaintiff's position fails to take into consideration
that parties do not have to both hold legal title in order to be
cotenants, but that a party holding a legal title and one holding
an equitable title can also be cotenants.

In this action

plaintiff brought suit alleging that the legal title to the
property was in the defendant, but that plaintiff was entitled to
have the court declare that he was a one-half owner of the
property.

In other words, plaintiff was alleging that defendant

was an undivided one-half owner of the property in equity by
virtue of a constructive trust and was asking the court to convert
that equitable interest to a legal interest through a recordable
decree of the court.

If the plaintiff did not have an equitable

interest in the property, he did not have a lawsuit.

In his

deposition plaintiff maintained the same position as set forth in
his Complaint, claiming therein that he had a right to one-half of
the proceeds from both parcels.

(See plaintiff's deposition,
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pages 23-27, R. 261-265, copies of which are attached hereto in
the Appendix,)
In 20 Am Jur 2d, Cotenancy and Joint Ownership,
Section l f "cotenancy" is defined as follows:
"The term fcotenancy' refers to the ownership of
property by two or more persons in such manner that they
have an undivided possession or right to possession, but
several freeholds, and thus defined it includes joint
tenancies, tenancies in common, and estates by the
entirety." (Emphasis added.)
Estates by the entirety are generally obsolete and can
be disregarded for purposes of this case.

Joint tenacies require

the four unities of time, title, interest and possession.
other cotenancies then are tenancies in common.
have in the present case.

All

That is what we

It was unequivocally plaintiff's

position that he was entitled to ownership of an undivided onehalf interest in the subject summer home (and the Salt Lake City
residence).

He did not claim that he was entitled to the north

half of the property, and the defendant the south half, or the
like.

He did not claim even that the parties should be joint

tenants with one another because obviously after the divorce
neither party was interested in having any right of survivorship
held by the other.

Plaintiff clearly asserted that he was already

a tenant in common with the defendant in equity and sought to have
the court establish that relationship with respect to the full
legal title through a decree of the court.
Let us note this example:

If two persons hold a

property as cotenants (whether as tenants in common or joint
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tenants), they have a joint right to possession.

This is so cjjhere

they hold legal titlef and it is also true where they hold
equitable title as when both are purchasing under contract.

In a

case where two persons hold legal title, if one of the parties
sells his half-interest to a third party on a uniform real estate
contract, can there be any question that the purchaser of the onehalf interest is a cotenant with the owner of the other halfinterest, and that they (the new buyer and the owner who is not
selling) have a joint right of possession to the property?

(The

seller of said one-half interest loses his right to possession and
holds "legal" title to said one-half interest as security only.)
We read in 77 Am Jur 2df Vendor and Purchaser, Sec. 317:
"A contract for the sale of land operates as an
equitable conversion; the vendee's interest under the
contract becomes realty and the vendor's interest under
the contract constitutes personalty. In equity the
purchaser is regarded as the owner subject to liability
for the unpaid price and the vendor as holding the legal
title in trust for him from the time a valid agreement for
the purchase of land is entered into. This view of the
estate of the purchaser is based on the maxim that 'equity
regards and treats as done whatf in good conscience, ought
to be done.' Accordingly, in equity a contract for the
sale of land is treated, for most purposes, precisely as
if it had been specifically performed. Thus, as a vendee
makes payments on a land contract the vendor becomes
trustee for him of the legal estate, and he becomes in
equity the owner of the land to the extent of payments
made. A contract for the sale of land, part of the
purchase price being paid and possession taken, vests
in the vendee an equitable title in fee."
If plaintiff is entitled to have the court adjudge that
he has an interest in the summer home, then in equity this is
taken as having already been done, and he is a cotenant with the
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defendant from the beginning.

It will hardly do to allow

plaintiff to now say in effect, "Please forget that I ever filed
this lawsuit as I have made other arrangements, and it is now
inconvenient for me for the court to note that I have been asking
in this action to be adjudged to be a legal owner of the summer
home."

Plaintiff's position that the plaintiff and defendant were

not cotenants simply is not sustainable.
With respect to the matter of adverse possession,
perhaps only this needs to be stated:

It is true that this case

does not involve adverse possession, but most cases illustrating
the fiduciary relationship between cotenants arise in the adverse
possession context.

Defendant does not assert, nor is the law of

fiduciary responsibility between cotenants limited to, adverse
possession cases.
20 Am Jur 2d, Cotenancy and Joint Ownership, Section 71,
states in part:
"In accordance with the general principle that
adversary title acquired by a cotenant inures to the
benefit of his cotenants, the rule in most states is
that where property owned in common is sold at a
judicial sale or pursuant to a power contained in a deed
of trust for the purpose of satisfying an obligation
which rests alike upon all of the coproprietors, none of
them can purchase the estate for his sole benefit. . .
" . . . And where the cotenancy property is purchased on
foreclosure by the creditor who in turn conveys to one
of the cotenants, the transaction is nothing more than
the removal of an encumbrance so far as the cotenants
are concerned, and the general rule applies."
See in support Hardin v. Counsel, 200 Ga 822,
38 SE 2d 549 (1946).
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The author further points out in said Section 71 that
even where a stranger purchases the title at the judicial sale, if
there is collusion, the general rule applies and the purchase is
held to be for the benefit of all cotenants.

It is not really

necessary to get into the matter of collusion because in this case
plaintiff claims that the judgment creditor purchased the property
at the alleged sheriff's sale (assuming that the sale was valid,
which the defendant contests), but in any event even if the sale
were valid, the judgment creditor purchased the property at
sherifffs sale, subsequently conveyed it to plaintiff and,
according to the general rule, such acquisition by plaintiff will
inure to the benefit of both plaintiff and defendant, subject only
to defendant's reimbursing plaintiff, which defendant is, and at
all times has been, willing to do.

Said Section 71 also states

that the general rule (that acquisition by one cotenant inures to
the benefit of all cotenants) "will likewise apply where, although
purchase by a third person intervenes, the substantial effect of
the latter's conveyance to one of the cotenants is, at least as
between the cotenants, a redemption from the foreclosure sale."
This is certainly the effect here where plaintiff pays
approximately $6,000 for a $165,000 summer home.
POINT III.

A FACT ISSUE EXISTS AS TO WHETHER OR NOT

PLAINTIFF AND PINE MEADOWS ASSOCIATION WERE IN COLLUSION IN
CONDUCTING THE SHERIFF'S SALE.
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As noted above, it is not really necessary for defendant
to establish collusion under existing law because the conveyance
by Pine Meadows to plaintiff inures to the benefit of defendant,
his cotenant, in any event.

In addition, it is clear that action

by plaintiff in collusion with Pine Meadows to deprive defendant
of her legitimate interest in the property is invalid.
Plaintiff's only response to this point is that defendant did not
take action to set aside or otherwise stay the execution sale.
The answer to that of course is that defendant did not know
anything about the execution sale since she was never served with
summons.

The execution sale only came to light in this lawsuit.

Even plaintiff acknowledges this fact when he says at page 17, " .
. . defendant herein has known about the Circuit Court action and
judgment since at least early 1992 . . . "

In her original brief

defendant has indicated that she intends to set aside that
judgment, if necessary, but since the purchase inures to the
benefit of the defendant, that action may be unnecessary, although
it may be advisable if plaintiff and defendant do not in fact owe
any money to the plaintiff as originally claimed by plaintiff.
The defendant was initially led to believe by the plaintiff that
no amounts were owing to the homeowners1 association.

If that is

so, then of course plaintiff and defendant jointly should seek
relief against Pine Meadows.

If, in fact, some amount is owing,

and defendant has been misled by plaintiff in that regard, then it
would not appear to be necessary or prudent for defendant to
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undertake such action inasmuch as the property has been redeemed
by plaintiff for the benefit of both defendant and plaintiff.

As

noted above, defendant has tendered to plaintiff her share of such
redemption, being one-half of the redemption price of $6,000.

It

would not stretch the imagination to note that she could easily
incur attorney's fees

and costs far in excess of that sum in

seeking to set aside the Circuit Court judgment and subsequently
trying the Circuit Court case.
Plaintiff further asserts that there is no issue of
collusion because the parties do not have an obligation one to the
other with respect to the subject property.

As noted in Point II

above, that is simply not the law.
Plaintiff states at page 21 of his brief:
"Assuming for the sake of argument that Mr. Morgan
and the homeowner's association did in fact collude to
'launder' the title to the summer home, and simultaneously
to pay the fees owing to the homeowner's association, then
defendant cannot describe one reason why such action on
the part of the plaintiff was illegal or improper."
In Point II above defendant clearly cites good reason
why that action was illegal and improper, and on summary judgment
all facts and inferences must be construed in favor of defendant.
This is particularly so where plaintiff's motion was not supported
by any kind of an affidavit, and therefore defendant was not even
required to file a counteraffidavit, but nevertheless requested of
the court, before it ruled on the Motion for Summary Judgment,
that she be given additional time in which to explore the issue of
collusion.

It was not really essential to defendant's case that
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further discovery take place on collusion because the case was not
ripe for summary judgment in any event due to the lack of any kind
of an affidavit filed by plaintiff in support of his Motion for
Summary Judgment.

If plaintiff fails to file an affidavit in

connection with summary judgment, defendant is not required to do
so, and the court cannot go beyond the pleadings for purposes of
summary judgment.
POINT IV.

THE PURPORTED FORECLOSURE IN THE CIRCUIT

COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY ESTABLISHES NO BASIS IN THIS ACTION TO
QUIET TITLE TO THE SUMMER HOME IN PLAINTIFF.
The foregoing is so because, as noted in Point II above:
1.

The parties were cotenants, and the action of the

plaintiff in purchasing the title from the "judgment creditor"
insures to the benefit of both parties.

See 20 Am Jur 2d,

Cotenancy and Joint Ownership, 71, cited above, and Hardin v.
Counsel, supra.
2.

Defendant was not served with summons in that

action, and the court therefore had no jurisdiction over her.
3.

The Circuit Court judgment was not a final judgment

in that the issues relating to the plaintiff were not yet disposed
of and, since it was not a final judgment, it was not subject to
foreclosure sale.

By definition, execution can only be levied

based on a "judgment," (Rule 69, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure)
and "judgment" as used in said Rule 69 means, in accordance with
Rule 54(a), URCP, a judgment "from which an appeal lies," in other
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words a final judgment.

Under Rule 54(b), URCPf anything less

than a final judgment is still subject to being modified by the
court at any time.

The so-called judgment against defendant in

the Circuit Court case was not final and was not subject to being
appealed or subject to having execution issued thereon.
Plaintiff's only defense to the foregoing is that
defendant should attack the Circuit Court judgment in that court.
The fact of the matter isf however, that defendant asserts the
outcome of that proceeding in this court to justify the court's
decreeing title in him, whereas the "judgment" thus asserted in
this court (by the plaintiff himself) is on its face invalid, and
this court is certainly obliged to note that and to refuse to give
credence to a judgment of an inferior court of this state, which
on its face is insufficient and invalid to sustain plaintiff's
claims regarding it because of lack of jurisdiction and lack of
finality.
POINT V.

DEFENDANT'S CLAIMS AGAINST PLAINTIFF UNDER

THE DECREE OF DIVORCE (IN THIS CONSOLIDATED ACTION) FOR ARREARS OF
MORTGAGE PAYMENTS, BACK TAXES, ARREARS OF INSURANCE, REPAIRS TO
THE RESIDENCE AND ARREARS OF CHILD SUPPORT TOTALING APPROXIMATELY
$49,590 WERE NOT SUBJECT TO DISMISSAL OR OTHER RESOLUTION ON
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
In response to this point plaintiff asserts in substance
in subparagraph A at page 24 of his brief that the court was
justified in dismissing defendant's Counterclaim because defendant
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did not file an affidavit in opposition to plaintiff's Motion for
Summary Judgment, that her "supplemental affidavit" was not
timely, and that the court was in effect justified in ignoring the
same.
The fallacy with this argument is that the plaintiff
does not even deal with the subject of "arrears" in his summary
judgment, and further defendant was not required to file an
affidavit at all because plaintiff had not filed an affidavit on
this point, and defendant was entitled to rely on the pleadings.
The fact that the defendant filed a supplemental affidavit in no
way changes the foregoing, but was only intended to emphasize to
the court that there were substantial and unresolved factual
issues existing.
In addition to the foregoing, in subparagraph B at page
25, the plaintiff appears to be asserting that the court could
rely on the deposition of the defendant and on the plaintiff's
Request for Admissions to justify dismissal of the Counterclaim.
Here again plaintiff's argument is in error because the Request
for Admissions merely required the defendant admit or deny that
defendant had no documents (other than those attached to said
Request) relating to roof repairs, listing the Salt Lake home,
real property taxes, mortgage payments and other repairs.

The

defendant did not have more documents, and therefore that Request
for Admission had to be admitted, but this does not preclude
defendant from claiming under the documents that were attached and
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also from establishing by oral testimony that the alleged amounts
sued for were indeed due to here.

(Normally documents are not

available to prove that some amount was not paid.

They are

usually only available to show that something was paid.)
Furthermoref the Requests don't even deal with the subject of
arrears of child support.

The defendant was entitled to her day

in court on those issuesf and was entitled to have the fact finder
pass upon her oral testimony. The same is true with respect to the
depositions.

There is no statement is defendant's deposition

which is inconsistent with, or which in any way precludes her
Counterclaim for arrears of mortgage payments, taxes, insurance,
repairs and child support, and plaintiff refers us to no such
passages in the depositions.

The same is true with respect to

plaintiff's deposition, and in fact plaintiff admits in his
deposition that he has no evidence to dispute defendant's claims
regarding arrears of taxes, reroofing charge and insurance.

He

further admits that he did not make child support payments.

(See

plaintiff's deposition, pages 45-46, R. 283-4.

Copies of said

pages are attached to this brief in the Appendix.)
The final "defense" to this point asserted by plaintiff
is set forth in his subparagraph C at page 25 wherein he asserts
that the trial court might be justified in paying an arrears of
child support by means of a property settlement.

It is true that

the defendant has not asserted any authority in support of her
position that such an offset would normally be improper, but it

-14-

appears logical.

The child support is ordered for the benefit of

the children so that their daily needs for food, clothing and
shelter can be supplied, and it appears that it would be a rare
situation where the court would be justified in allowing that
obligation to be paid by means of a property settlement offset.
It is a point that defendant made in her original brief, and we
believe it to be generally a valid one, but it is certainly not
crucial because in any event, even if the court undertook to do
such a thing, the court would be required to make findings of fact
setting forth the fact that the court had done it and setting out
upon what basis it did so.

The court has made no such findings,

nor would it appear that the court could do so on a motion for
summary judgment where the court is not sitting as a fact finder.
POINT VI.

THERE IS NO INDEPENDENT BASIS FOR THE TRIAL

COURT'S RULING.
At Point 6 of his brief plaintiff appears to suggest
that even if the court were otherwise in error, the court could
have dismissed this case for failure to prosecute.
We respectfully submit that that is totally erroneous
and would not in any event be a basis for granting summary
judgment.
It is within the power of either party to move a case
along.

The plaintiff cannot complain that the case does not move

fast enough, because it is entirely within his power to move it
along as fast as he wants to.

The plaintiff initiated this
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actionf and it would appear that if either party should bear the
greater burden of moving the case along, it would be the one who
started it.
Furthermore, it is clear from the court's ruling (see
Minute Entry in the Addendum to defendant's initial brief herein)
that the plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment was based solely
on what the court perceived as a "factual differentiation in this
case and the cases cited by the defendant and in particular
Heiselt v. Heiselt the court is of the opinion that the general
rule which as stated therein does not apply herein.
the plaintiff's motion is well taken."

Therefore,

(See Minute Entry in

appendix to appellant's initial brief herein.)
The sole basis for the court's ruling was the court's
belief that the law regarding the fidiciary duty of cotenants was
not applicable to this case.

To try to stretch that express

determination into a dismissal by the court of the claims of both
parties for failure to prosecute is totally unsupportable.
POINT VII.

IT WOULD BE ERROR FOR THE COURT TO CONSIDER

THE TRIAL COURT ORDER OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS AN ORDER CONSISTING
OF MULTIPLE PARTS.
There is no basis for bifurcating the summary judgment
as suggested by plaintiff.

It is in error in its entirety.

At Point 7 of plaintiff's brief, he appears to be
asserting that even if the court finds error with regard to the
court's determination that defendant's Counterclaim regarding
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various arrears should be dismissed, that the court should still
leave standing that portion of the summary judgment awarding
plaintiff the summer home.

The plaintiff also appears to suggest

that if this court finds that the trial court made an error in
awarding the defendant the Salt Lake County home, that he has no
objection to having that matter sent back for trial on that issue.
There is no basis for the foregoing suggestions.
First of all, defendant has shown adequate grounds for
setting aside the summary judgment with regard to the summer home.
Furthermore, if the rulings regarding the house and/or
defendant's Counterclaim for various arrears need to be reversed,
then the judgment under Rule 54(b) cannot be a final one, the
entire matter has to be sent back, and any portion of the judgment
would in any event remain subject to being modified by the court
below at any time.
Finally, the only basis upon which the court could have
awarded the summer home to the plaintiff would have to be because
the court awarded equivalent property to the defendant, and any
such issue would have to be based on findings by the trial court
after a factual hearing.

This Honorable Court does not have

before it sufficient facts to resolve the equities between the
respective parties, and a full plenary trial will be necessary to
establish such facts.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, and those set forth in
defendant's initial brief, the Summary Judgment and Order of the
trial court is in error and should be reversed in its entirety and
the matter remanded to the trial court for trial on the merits
with respect to all issues and all parties.
ORAL ARGUMENT
Appellant respectfully requests oral argument on this
appeal.
DATED the

>?

day of March, 1993.
Respectfully submitted,

GORDON A. MADSEN
ROBERT C. CUMMINGS
Attorney for Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Four copies of the foregoing Reply Brief of Appellant
were "tftarttrsd to Mary C. Corporon, attorney for appellee, at her
address, 310 South Main Street, Suite 1400, Salt Lake City, Utah
84101, penrtragg- prepaid, the

^7

day of March, 1992.

Attorney for Appellant
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APPENDIX
Deposition of Dale H. Morgan
Pages 23 - 27
Pages 45 - 46

23

A

I seen it sometime back.

I don't know if it was

the time it was filed.
Q

Calling your attention to paragraph 8 —

well,

excuse me, paragraph 6, you allege in your complaint that in
September or October of 1984 defendant Barbara Morgan
contacted you and you were then living outside the state.
Where were you then living?
A

I think it was Arkansas.

Q

And she advised you, you claim, that she had

purchasers for both parcels of real property?
A

That's true.

Q

You say she was the one that called you?

A

Yes.

Q

You didn't contact her?

A

I contacted her several times.

Q

But with regard to this conversation?

A

You're getting technical.

I don't remember.

There was several conversations.
Q

In any event, I take it this was by phone?

A

That's correct.

Q

And in that phone conversation she claimed to

have buyers for both parcels; is that correct?
A

One or two.

I don't remember.

She said she had

prospective buyers.
Q

Tell me the whole contents of that conversation

DEPOSITION OF DALE H. MORGAN
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to the best you can.
A

I can't remember that conversation.

Q

Any of it?

A

Yeah, I can give you the essence of it.

Q

That's what I'm asking you to do.

A

I just did.

I said she said she had prospective

buyers.
Q

Is that all she said?

A

Well, there was many other things that was said.

Q

What else do you remember about that

conversation?
A

I don't remember.

Q

Did you discuss the price, for example?

A

No, I didn't that I can recall.

Q

Did you discuss any kind of terms of what was

being offered or anything of the kind?
A

You're asking me something that I can't

remember.
Q

You tell me you don't remember, but I'm asking

you the particulars of that conversation.
property was listed, was it not, by you?

First of all, the
Both parcels were

listed with real estate agents?
A

I don't remember whether it was or wasn't at

that time.
Q

Did you ever have the property listed?

00262
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A

Yes.

Q

To whom or with whom?

k

I don't recall.

Q

Do you know for what time period?

A

No, I do not.

Q

Do you know whether or not the buyer that you

claim was discussed in this conversation had been produced
by a real estate agent that you had retained or not?
A

I don't know if I retained him.

I just said I

do not know.
Q

You also just said you did retain some listing

party?
A

You asked if it had ever been listed and I said

yes, not this particular time.
Q

Well, do you know that, whether it was or wasn't

listed wi th your agent at this particular time?
A

No, I do not know.

Q

My question then was, was there anything

discussed to suggest that it was your listing agent or not
who produced the would be buyer, if you know?
A

And I said I do not know.

Q

Now was there anything at all discussed about

what proceeds you were to receive out of this would be sale?
A

At my understanding at the time, and I do not

know all the discussion, was that all the proceeds just like
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1

we had agreed to in this would be divided equally,

2

Q

You didn't ask what those proceeds would be?

3

A

How do I know?

4
5
6

I do not know what the offer

was, if there was, in fact, an offer.
Q

You didn't explore that actual in this

conversation?

7

A

No.

8

Q

It didn't matter to you who the buyer was, what

9
10
11

the potential price would be, what proceeds would be coming
from it to you or otherwise; is that what you're saying?
A

No, because I knew whatever it was would be

12

divided equally.

13

going to give it away.

14

Q

I'm sure that if she had one she's not

And any other other —

well, specifically do you

15

remember these parts of that same conversation, do you

16

remember telling Barbara that you wanted the property out of

17

your name because of the woman you were then living with who

18

was getting your assets?

19

conversation along that line?

20

A

No, no, none.

21

Q

That you're

22

Do you recall any such

saying you do remember that that

didn't happen?

23

A

Yes, I say that did not happen.

24

Q

While you can't remember otherwise what did

25

happen, you're sure that didn't?
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A

I am positive that did not happen,

Q

And did you also indicate to her in that

conversation that by giving her the deeds to the property
you were absolving yourself from further responsibilities in
the way of debts, payments, roofs or anything else in the
way of liabilities, that you were walking away from it?
A

No.

Q

You're sure that conversation didn't occur?

A

I am positive of it.

Q

And is it your recollection that —

pardon me,

if I were to say Barbara's recollection is that you were the
one that initiated this conversation, you earlier said you
don't remember who initiated it, one or the other of you did
but you're not now sure?
A

That's right.

Q

Who prepared the quit claim deed that you make

reference to in your complaint?
(Exhibit No. 6 & 7 marked for identification.)
Q

(BY MR. MADSEN)

I hand you what's been marked

Deposition Exhibit 6 and 7.
A

I prepared it.

Q

You had the legal description?

A

Yes.

Q

And you f i l l e d that in?

A

Yes.

00?n~

IT
Q

Take the time to read it now, because I'm going

to be asking you some questions about it.
MS. CORPORON:
MR- MADSEN:

Just the counterclaim portion?
The counterclaim portion.

Q

(BY MR. MADSEN)

Have you read it, Mr. Morgan?

A

Don't say as I understand it but I read it.

Q

You note in there that Barbara Morgan indicates

tax payments she had made on the properties.

Do you recall

reading that?
A

Yes, I read that.

Q

Do you have any evidence to dispute that she

made those tax payments?
A

I don't know.

Q

Do you have any evidence —

she alleges in there

that she paid for the roofing of the home.
A

No, I do not know.

Q

You don't know and have no evidence —

I should

probably have told you that your counsel filed a general
denial in her reply to those allegations which means they're
at issue.

I'm now saying what evidence do you have, if any,

to disprove those particular amounts of claims?

Do you see

what I'm getting at?
A

Yes, I understand.

Q

I began with the taxes.

Do you have any

evidence to dispute the payments that she alleges she made?
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A

NO*

Q

Do you have any evidence to dispute the payments

she made on the reroofing?

A,

No.

°

Do you have any evidence to dispute the payments

she made for insurance?
A

No.

Q

And you've already indicated while you dispute

the children needed support you have made no payment of
support money as per the requirements; is that correct?

A

That's correct.

Well, let's stop right there.

When you say I never made any payments, I said I have not
made any payments to her, but the children lived with me
until September of '83.

Q

Of course that's disputable, but that's your

position.

A

That's fine*

Q

Your position is that's why you didn't make

That's my position.

them, but you made none; is that correct?

A

That's correct.

Q

Now again getting the conversations, let me

suggest one other area and if you have a memory about it,
fine, if you don't I'll understand, but do you recall having
any conversations during this four year period with Barbara
in which you wanted to borrow money and use the property as
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